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Abstract
Trust is a critical factor in cloud computing; in present practice it depends largely on perception of reputation, and self
assessment by providers of cloud services. We begin this paper with a survey of existing mechanisms for establishing
trust, and comment on their limitations. We then address those limitations by proposing more rigorous mechanisms
based on evidence, attribute certification, and validation, and conclude by suggesting a framework for integrating
various trust mechanisms together to reveal chains of trust in the cloud.
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Introduction
Cloud computing has become a prominent paradigm
of computing and IT service delivery. However, for any
potential user of cloud services, they will ask “can I
trust this cloud service?” Furthermore, what exactly does
“trust” mean in the context of cloud computing? What
is the basis of that trust? If the attributes of a cloud ser-
vice (or a service provider) are used as evidence for trust
judgment on the service (or provider respectively), on
what basis should users believe the attributes claimed by
cloud providers? Who are authorities to monitor, mea-
sure, assess, or validate cloud attributes? The answers to
those questions are essential for wide adoption of cloud
computing and for cloud computing to evolve into a trust-
worthy computing paradigm. As addressed in [1], “the
growing importance of cloud computing makes it increas-
ingly imperative that we grapple with the meaning of trust
in the cloud and how the customer, provider, and society
in general establish that trust.”
The issues and challenges of trust in cloud computing
have been widely discussed from different perspectives
[2-10]. A number of models and tools have been pro-
posed [11-13]. Each contributes a partial view of cloud
trust, but lacking still is a complete picture illustrating
how cloud entities work together to form a “societal” sys-
tem, with a solid grounding in trust, serving to facilitate
trusted paths to trusted cloud services. The NIST Cloud
Computing Reference Architecture [14] identified cloud
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brokers and cloud auditors as entities who conduct assess-
ment of cloud services; however, there are few studies
on trust relation analysis and the chains of trust from
cloud users to cloud services (or providers) through those
intermediary cloud entities. In this paper, we investigate
trust mechanisms for the cloud, present our vision of
the “societal systems mechanisms” of trust and a frame-
work for analyzing trust relations in the cloud, and suggest
trust mechanisms which combine attribute certification,
evidence-based trust and policy-based trust.
Because of the criticality of many computing services
and tasks, some cloud clients cannot make decisions
about employing a cloud service based solely on infor-
mal trust mechanisms (e.g. web-based reputation scores);
these decisions need to be based on formal trust mech-
anisms, which are more certain, more accountable, and
more dependable. Here, the word “formal” is meant to
carry the sense of “official” assessment in a society. In
our suggested cloud trust mechanisms, the attributes of a
cloud service (or its provider) are used as evidence for the
user’s trust judgment on the service (or provider), and the
belief in those attributes is based on “formal” certification
and chains of trust for validation.
In this paper, we focus somewhat informally on the con-
ceptual basis for analysis of trust in the cloud; we do not
at this time address mathematical modeling, which would
involve many more precise details, formal languages, and
specific use cases.With respect to terminology, an “entity”
is an autonomous agent; a “cloud entity” refers to an entity
in the cloud, such as a cloud provider, a cloud user, a cloud
broker, and a cloud auditor; “semantics of trust” refers to
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precisely defined meaning of trust, including the relations
among the components of trust.
This paper is organized as the following sections: (1)
we define the semantics of trust; (2) we review the state-
of-the-art trust mechanisms for cloud computing; (3) we
discuss policy-based trust judgment, which is a real formal
trust mechanism used in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
practice. By policy-based trust, a cloud service or service
provider can be trusted if it conforms to a trusted pol-
icy; (4) we present a general structure of evidence-based
trust, by which particular attributes of a cloud service or
attributes of a service provider are used as evidence for
trust judgment; (5) we discuss attribute assessment and
attribute certification, by which some attributes of a cloud
service (or service provider) are formally certified, and the
belief in those attributes is based on formal certification
and chains of trust for validation; (6) we present an inte-
grated view of the trust mechanisms for cloud computing,
and analyze the trust chains connecting cloud entities; (7)
finally, we give a summary and identify further research.
Semantics of trust
The term “trust” is often loosely used in the literature on
cloud trust, frequently as a general term for “security” and
“privacy”, such as [4]. What exactly does “trust” mean?
Trust is a complex social phenomenon. Based on the
concepts of trust developed in social sciences [15,16], we
use the following definition [17]:
Trust is a mental state comprising: (1) expectancy - the
trustor expects a specific behavior from the trustee
(such as providing valid information or effectively
performing cooperative actions); (2) belief - the trustor
believes that the expected behavior occurs, based on the
evidence of the trustee’s competence, integrity, and
goodwill; (3) willingness to take risk - the trustor is
willing to take risk for that belief.
It is important to understand that the expected behav-
ior of trustee is beyond the trustor’s control; the trustor’s
belief in that expected behavior of trustee is based on the
trustee’s capability, goodwill (including intension or moti-
vation), and integrity. The integrity of the trustee gives the
trustor confidence about the predictability of the trustee’s
behavior.
We identify two types of trust, based on the trustor’s
expectancy: trust in performance is trust about what the
trustee performs, whereas trust in belief is trust about
what the trustee believes. The trustee’s performance could
be the truth of what the trustee says or the successful-
ness of what the trustee does. For simplicity, we represent
both as a statement, denoted as a Boolean-type term, x,
called a reified proposition [18]. For the first case, x is what
the trustee says; for the second, x represents a successful
performance, which is regarded as a statement that the
trustee made, describing his or her performance. A trust
in performance relationship, trust_p(d, e, x, k), represents
that trustor d trusts trustee e regarding e’s performance x
in context k. This relationship means that if x is made by e
in context k, then d believes x in that context. In first-order
logic (FOL),
trust_p(d, e, x, k) ≡ madeBy(x, e, k) ⊃ believe(d, k⊃˙x)
(1)
where ⊃˙ is an operator used for reified propositions to
mimic the logical operator for implication, ⊃. A trust
in belief relationship, trust_b(d, e, x, k), represents that
trustor d trusts trustee e regarding e’s belief (x) in con-
text k. This trust relationship means that if e believes x in
context k, then d also believes x in that context:
trust_b(d, e, x, k) ≡ believe(e, k⊃˙x) ⊃ believe(d, k⊃˙x).
(2)
Trust in belief is transitive; trust in performance is not;
however, trust in performance can propagate through trust
in belief. A more detailed account can be found in [17,19].
From the definition above, the trustor’s mental state
of belief in his expectancy on the trustee is dependent
on the evidence about the trustee’s competency, integrity,
and goodwill. This leads to logical structures of reason-
ing from belief in evidence to belief in expectancy. We will
discuss this later in § ‘Evidence-based trust’.
The semantics of trust in the context of cloud comput-
ing has the same semantic structure as stated above; what
still needed are the specific expectancy and the specific
characteristics of cloud entities’s competency, integrity,
and goodwill in the context of cloud computing. We will
discuss further in § ‘Evidence-based trust’.
State-of-the-art trust mechanisms in clouds
In this section, we discuss existing trust mechanisms in
the cloud. From the discussion, we will see that each of the
mechanisms addresses one aspect of trust but not others.
Reputation based trust
Trust and reputation are related, but different. Basically,
trust is between two entities; but the reputation of an
entity is the aggregated opinion of a community towards
that entity. Usually, an entity that has high reputation is
trusted bymany entities in that community; an entity, who
needs to make trust judgment on an trustee, may use the
reputation to calculate or estimate the trust level of that
trustee.
Reputation systems are widely used in e-commerce and
P2P networks. The reputation of cloud services or cloud
service providers will undoubtably impact cloud users’
choice of cloud services; consequently, cloud providers
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try to build and maintain higher reputation. Naturally,
reputation-based trust enters into the vision of making
trust judgment in cloud computing [11,13,20].
Reputation is typically represented by a comprehensive
score reflecting the overall opinion, or a small number of
scores on several major aspects of performance. It is unre-
alistic to ask a large number of cloud users to rate a cloud
service or service provider against a large set of complex
and fine-grained criteria. The reputation of a cloud service
provider reflects the overall view of a community towards
that provider, therefore it is more useful for the cloud
users (mostly individual users) in choosing a cloud service
frommany options without particular requirements. Rep-
utation may be helpful when initially choosing a service,
but is inadequate afterwards. In particular, as a user gains
experience with the service, the trust placed on that ser-
vice meeting performance or reliability requirements will
evolve based on that experience.
SLA verification based trust
“Trust, but verify” is a good advice for dealing with
the relationships between cloud users and cloud service
providers. After establishing the initial trust and employ-
ing a cloud service, the cloud user needs to verify and
reevaluate the trust. A service level agreement (SLA) is a
legal contract between a cloud user and a cloud service
provider. Therefore, quality of service (QoS) monitoring
and SLA verification is an important basis of trust man-
agement for cloud computing. A number of models that
derive trust from SLA verification have been proposed
[12,13].
A major issue is that SLA focuses on the “visible” ele-
ments of cloud service performance, and does not address
“invisible” elements such as security and privacy. Another
issue is that many cloud users lack the capability to do
fine grainedQoSmonitoring and SLA verification on their
own; a professional third party is needed to provide these
services. In a private cloud, there may be a cloud broker or
a trust authority (e.g. RSA’s CTA, to be discussed later in
§ ‘Cloud transparency mechanisms’), whom is trusted in
the trust domain of the private cloud; so the trusted bro-
ker or trust authority can provide the users in the private
cloud the services of QoS monitoring and SLA verifica-
tion. In a hybrid cloud or interclouds, a user within a
private cloud might still rely on the private cloud trust
authority to conduct QoS monitoring and SLA verifica-
tion; however, in a public cloud, individual users and some
small organizations without technical capability may use a
commercial professional cloud entity as trust broker. We
discuss this in § ‘Trust as a service’.
Cloud transparency mechanisms
Transparency and accountability are a recognized basis
for gaining trust on cloud providers. To increase
transparency of the cloud, the Cloud Security Alliance
(CSA) launched the “Security, Trust & Assurance Reg-
istry (STAR)” program [21], a free publicly accessible
registry which allows cloud service providers to publish
self-assessment of their security controls, in either a “Con-
sensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ)” or a
“Cloud ControlsMatrix (CCM)”, which embody CSA pub-
lished best practices. CAIQ contains over 140 questions
which cloud users or auditors may ask; CCM is a frame-
work describing how a cloud provider aligns with the
CSA security guide [22]. Examples of cloud providers’ self-
assessments can be found at the CSA STAR website [23].
STAR is a useful source for users seeking cloud services.
However, the information offered is a cloud provider’s
self -assessment; cloud users may want assessments per-
formed by some independent third-party professional
organizations.
Different from STAR, CSC.com proposed [24] and CSA
adopted the CloudTrust Protocol (CTP) [25], a request-
response mechanism for a cloud user to obtain specific
information about the “elements of transparency” applied
to a specific cloud service provider; the elements of
transparency cover aspects of configuration, vulnerability,
audit log, service management, service statistics, and so
forth. “The primary purpose of the CTP and the elements
of transparency is to generate evidence-based confidence
that everything that is claimed to be happening in the
cloud is indeed happening as described, ..., and nothing
else” [26]. CTP provides an interesting channel between
cloud users and cloud service providers, allowing users
internal observations of cloud service operations. How-
ever, like STAR, an essential weakness of CTP is that its
information is provided by cloud service provider itself.
Dishonest cloud service providers can filter out or change
the data. From the point of view of a trust judgement, it
raises questions of the data’s reliability.
Trust as a service
We have already noted the need for employing third-party
professionals for QoS monitoring and SLA verification.
Independent assessment has utility in other aspects of
cloud computing, as well.
RSA announced the Cloud Trust Authority (CTA) [27]
as a cloud service, called Trust as a Service (TaaS) to
provide a single point for configuring and managing secu-
rity of cloud services from multiple providers. The initial
release of the CTA includes: identity service, enabling sin-
gle sign-on among multiple cloud providers, and compli-
ance profiling service, enabling a user to view the security
profiles of multiple cloud providers against a common
benchmark. The CTA is a tool specialized on cloud trust
management, and is developed from RSA’s philosophy
of “trust = visibility + control” [28]. As a cloud-based
tool, the CTA could largely simplify cloud users’ trust
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management. However, a cloud user must still make trust
judgment about the cloud service assertions streamed in
the CTA, because those assertions were made by cloud
service providers themselves. Most importantly, a cloud
user needs to judge the trustworthiness of the CTA in role
as an intermediary.
The essential issue of any TaaS mechanism is about
what is the basis of the trust relation between cloud users
and those commercial trust brokers. We will discuss the
answers later in subsections ‘Trust judgement on a cloud
broker’ and ‘Trust judgment on a cloud service provider’.
Formal accreditation, audit, and standards
Because self-assessment exercises may be compromised
by dishonesty, some argue that formal accreditation from
a trusted independent authority is necessary for a healthy
cloudmarket; some others argue that formal accreditation
“would stifle industry innovation” [2].
External audits, attestations, or certifications for more
general purpose (not specific to clouds) have been used
in practice. Examples include: the ISO/IEC 27000 series,
which are international information security management
standards [29]; “Statement on Standards for Attestation
Engagements No. 16” (SSAE 16) [30], which is an attes-
tation standard for service organizations, put forth by the
Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). SSAE 16 is
replacing the older standard “Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards No. 70” (SAS 70); “The International Standard on
Assurance Engagements 3402” (ISAE 3402) [31], which is
a globally recognized standard for assurance reporting on
service organizations.
Specific to cloud computing, in addition to CTP
and STAR (for self-assessment), CSA also launched
the CloudAudit initiative, which provides a common
interface and namespace for cloud providers to pro-
duce audit assertions, and allows cloud users to auto-
mate use of that data in their own audit processes.
CloudAudit could facilitate automated cloud audit, con-
ducted by cloud providers (for self-audit), cloud users
(for cloud user-audit), and cloud auditors (for formal
audit). CloudAudit, CCM, CAIQ, and CTP form the CSA
Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC)
stack.
To ensure trustworthiness, the International Grid Trust
Federation (IGTF) issued GFD-I.169 as guidelines for
auditing the cloud/grid assurance bodies – the cer-
tification authorities (CAs) issuing X.509 certificates
[32].
A formal process for assessment of cloud services and
their providers by independent third parties, acceptable to
both cloud users and providers, does not yet exist. Formal
accreditation specific to independent third-party cloud
assessors also does not exist.
Further discussion
A reputation-based trust mechanism reflects the overall
view of a community towards a cloud service provider. It
can help with cloud service selection; but is insufficient for
other important purposes.
After establishing an initial trust on a cloud service, a
cloud user needs to verify and re-evaluate that trust. QoS
monitoring and SLA verification based trust mechanism
can help to manage the existing cloud trust relations. The
QoS/SLA mechanism can manage “visible” elements of
the black box of a cloud service, such as performance; but
it cannot help to manage the “invisible” elements inside a
cloud service, such as privacy protection.
Cloud transparency mechanisms provide channels for
cloud users to “observe” how cloud service providers oper-
ate. The mechanisms help to establish trust by making
the cloud services more “visible”. The essential issue of the
transparency mechanisms is that the information is pro-
vided by cloud service providers themselves; thus we need
to identify the basis for cloud users to trust them.
The TaaS mechanism provides cloud users a solution
where the sophisticated tasks of cloud trust management
can be delegated to third-party professionals. However
similarly the basis for cloud users to trust them needs to
be estabulished.
One possible solution to the problems posed in the
above mechanisms is formal accreditation and audit. The
mechanisms of formal accreditation and audit in the cloud
do not exist yet and are still in discussion.
In the rest of this paper, we continue to explore the cloud
trust mechanisms by borrowing policy-based trust mech-
anism from PKI, combined with evidence-based trust and
attribute certification and validation.
Policy-based trust
We earlier identified the need for “formal” trust mech-
anisms in cloud computing. In a related sphere, PKI is
a widely used mature technology that employs “formal”
trust mechanisms to support digital signature, key certi-
fication and validation, as well as attribute certification
and validation. Can we apply trust ideas used in PKI to
establish “formal” trust mechanisms to the cloud?
To simplify the discussion, consider the example illus-
trated in Figure 1. Alice has a digital document suppos-
edly signed by Bob using his private key K ′b. To validate,
she needs Bob’s public key Kb. Assume that Alice trusts
only her trust anchor certification authority CA1, and she
knows only K1, her trust anchor’s public key. In order for
her to verify the signature on the document as being Bob’s,
she needs to discover a certification path (a chain of cer-
tificates) fromCA1 toCA3 who has issued Bob’s public key
certificate. As shown in the figure, Alice uses CA1’s pub-
lic key K1 to validate CA2’s public key K2; because Alice
trusts CA1 on public key certification, and CA2’s public
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Figure 1 PKI trust example. This example reveals trust relations in
public key certification and validation.
key is certified by CA1, Alice can believe that CA2’s public
key is K2; then Alice uses K2 to validate CA3’ public key
K3; and finally uses K3 to validate Bob’s public key Kb. The
main issue is why Alice should believe K3 is CA3’s public
key and Kb is Bob’s public key?
Essentially, to infer belief in a statement “Bob’s key is
Kb”, Alice needs to trust CA3, the creator of that asser-
tion, with respect to the truth of the statement; however,
this raises questions that ask about the foundation of that
trust, and how the trust is inferred or calculated. Some
research suggests that the trust comes from recommen-
dations along the chain of certificates by those certificate
issuers [33]; but the practice of digital certification and
validation in real PKI systems suggests that the trust comes
from compliance with certain certificate policies.
As specified in IETF RFC 5280 [34], in addition to the
basic statement that binds a public key with a subject, a
public key certificate also contains a certificate policy (CP)
extension. For a public key certificate issued to a CA, the
certificate means that the issuing CA who conforms to the
specified CP asserts that the subject CA has the certified
public key, and the subject CA also adheres to the speci-
fied CP. As a result, to infer Alice’s belief in CA3’s key and
Bob’s key, she must trust that CP in the sense that any CA
conforming to that CP will generate valid public key cer-
tificates. There are more complex and interesting issues in
PKI trust [35], but for the purpose of this paper, we will
not go further.
In summary, as PKI is currently practiced, trust in a
certification authority (CA) with respect to issuing and
maintaining valid public key certificates is based on the
CA’s conformance with certain certificate policies. Certifi-
cate policies play a central role in PKI trust. We call this
trust mechanism as policy-based trust.
Evidence-based trust
We now discuss using attributes as evidence to make trust
decision.
From the definition of trust given in § ‘Semantics of
Trust’, a trustor’s belief in the expected behaviour of
trustee is based on the evidence about the trustee’s
attributes of competency, goodwill, and integrity, with
respect to that expectation. Formally, we could express a
general form of evidence-based trust as follows:
believe(u, attr1(s, v1))∧... ∧ believe(u, attrn(s, vn))
→ trust_ ∗ (u, s, x, c) (3)
which states that if an individual u believes a subject s
has attribute attr1 with value v1, ..., attribute attrn with
value vn, then u trusts (either trust in belief or trust in
performance) s with respect to x, the performance of s
or information created or believed by s, in a specific
context c.
An entity’s belief in an attribute assessment is depen-
dent on whether the entity trusts the entity who
makes that attribute assessment. Formally, based on
the definition of trust-in-performance, formula (1) in
§ ‘Semantics of Trust’, we could have
trust_p(u, a, attr(s, v), c) ∧ madeBy(attr(s, v), a, c)
∧ inContext(c) → believe(u, attr(s, v)), (4)
which states that if an individual u trusts an attribute
authority a to make assertions about a subject s has
attribute attr with value v in a specific context c, a spe-
cific assertion attr(s, v) is made by a in context c, and the
context c is the case, then u believes that assertion. In the
formula, attr(s, v) is a reified proposition represented as
a term. Since not only the attributes of a cloud service
may be assessed and certified, but also the attributes of a
cloud entity may be assessed and certified, in the above
formula, we may use attr(e, v) to state that cloud entity
e has attribute attr with value e. In this way, a logic for-
mula similar to (4) can describe the relation from trust in
a cloud auditor to the belief in the certified attribute of a
cloud entity such as a service provider.
To use attributes as evidence in trust judgment, we orga-
nize the relevant attributes in a two-dimension space: (1)
one dimension goes along the domain of the trustor’s
expectation on the trustee, in the context of cloud com-
puting, including aspects of performance, security, and
privacy; (2) another dimension goes along the source of
trust, that is, what makes the trustor trust the trustee,
including the trustee’s competency (capability), integrity
(consistency in performance and principles), and goodwill
(motivation or intension).
Figure 2 illustrates a spectrum of attributes in cloud
computing. Most commonly considered ones fall in the
category of competency; attributes that reflect integrity
and goodwill are frequently neglected, and should be
included in trust judgment. To neglect these is to implic-
ity assume that trust does not depend on them, or if it
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Figure 2 Attributes for evidence-based trust. The attributes used
for evidence-based trust judgment can be organized in two
dimensions: (1) sources of trust, including competency, goodwill, and
integrity; (2) domain-specific expectation.
does, that dependence is satisfied. Characterization and
quantification of integrity and goodwill is an interesting
research challenge. A trustee’s historical behavior might
reflect integrity; goodwill might be quantified as per-
formance improvements are measured, and cloud users’
feedback.
Different cloud users may have different trust poli-
cies, involving different trust attributes. A common trust
framework supports evidence-based trust judgment for
different users and different policies. The connection
between evidence-based trust and policy-based trust is
that the belief that an entity conforms to a trusted pol-
icy implies the belief that the entity has a set of attributes
associated with that policy.
Attribute assessment and certification
When the attributes of a cloud service (or cloud entity)
are used as evidence to make trust judgment on the ser-
vice (or entity), the sources of attribute assessment must
be trustworthy, and those attributes need to be distributed
in a trustworthy way. In the following, we first discuss
the source of attribute assertions and then we discuss
attribute certification as a formal approach to deliver
cloud attributes.
Sources of cloud attribute assessment
Assessment of attributes may come from several sources:
the cloud user, other peer users, the service provider,
cloud auditor/accrediator, and cloud broker. We discuss
each of them in turn.
Cloud user observation
If a cloud user has already interacted with a cloud service
or a cloud service provider, then the experience will be the
user’s direct basis for cloud attribute assessment. Experi-
ence is a fundamental factor of trust, and this kind of trust,
called “interpersonal trust”, has long been studied in both
social sciences and computing science.
The advantage of using direct interaction experience is
that the data used are first-hand andmay bemost relevant;
the disadvantage is that the data accumulated are limited
with respect to the sample size and the range of the usage
of the cloud service. A specific user’s experience is just one
piece of the information revealing the trustworthiness of
a cloud service.
Opinions of other peer users
When a cloud user has only limited direct experience with
a cloud service (or none at all), other peer users’ opinions
could be an important source of cloud attribute assess-
ment. The major issues are: can those peer reviewers be
trusted with respect to their opinions on the cloud ser-
vice? and how can those different opinions be aggregated?
There are at least two basic approaches to solving the
problem: social network based and reputation based.
Social network based approach A cloud user takes one
or more trusted friends’ opinions, and combines them
with that user’s personal trust in each of those friends.
That user may not have a direct trust relation with a
“popular” reviewer, but the user may derive an indirect
trust relation with that reviewer through a trust network
[17,36], which is a specific form of social networks, com-
prising of only trust relations. The social network based
approach is an analogue of how a person initially trusts
an entity, unknown before in the real world. Models in
this category are heuristic. Typically, one asks only a small
number of trusted friends for their opinions.When a large
number of peer users’ opinions are involved, the approach
becomes reputation based.
Reputation based approach A typical methodology is
to aggregate a large number of peer user’s ratings, often
seen in e-commerce product/service ratings. The advan-
tage is that the data used for assessment may cover many
more situations and have a wider time-window of obser-
vations; this approach can have a much wider view on
the cloud service (or its provider) than a single user does.
On the other hand, some weaknesses exist: a large num-
ber of raters are required for meaningful and objective
ratings; the raters and users should have a common under-
standing of the attribute semantics and the corresponding
measurement; this approach is suitable for the purpose
of overall rating, or is limited to rating a small number
of attributes; the trustworthiness of individual voter are
rarely taken into account; usually, as in e-commerce, the
reputation of product/service is calculated by an organi-
zation in a centralized manner, so the organization may
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manipulate the calculation, and the calculating service
may become a single point of attack.
Statements from cloud service provider
Some cloud service attributes may be specified, promised,
or revealed by its provider. In “service specification” and
advertisements, a service provider will specify the fea-
tured attributes of a cloud service; the attributes of the
service stated in a SLA are the promises of that service
provider to that user. Through the CloudTrust Protocol
(CTP) [26], cloud users can request and get a response
from the provider about “the elements of transparency”,
the information concerning the compliance, security, pri-
vacy, integrity, and operational security history.
However, information about the attributes of a ser-
vice given by the service provider are usually not directly
believed by the first-time users. Sometimes a user may
believe a service provider’s statements or promises, based
on the brand name or reputation of that service provider,
or based on the user’s past experience of interaction. In
any case, the stated attributes are an important part of the
watch-list in cloud service monitoring, and they are used
to verify whether the service provider behaves as trusted.
The conclusion of the verification will be used by the users
to build or revise their trust in that service provider.
In general, the statements or promises about the
attributes of a cloud service given by a cloud service
provider itself need to be verified before used for decision
making, and cloud attribute assertions from third party
independent professional organizations are expected,
whichwe discuss in the following subsections ‘Assessment
of cloud auditor/accreditor’ and ‘Observation of cloud
brokers’.
Assessment of cloud auditor/accreditor
NIST identifies a cloud auditor as “a party that can con-
duct independent assessment of cloud services, infor-
mation system operations, performance, and security of
a cloud implementation. A cloud auditor can evaluate
the services provided by a cloud provider in terms of
security controls, privacy impact, performance, etc.” [14].
Obviously, cloud audit is an important channel of cloud
attribute assessment. A limitation of cloud auditing is that
the trust assessment reflects only the state at the time
of the audit. Trust changes dynamically, as a function of
dynamic monitoring of behavior.
A cloud auditor’s assessment is usually regarded as a
reliable information source for trust judgment. To some
cloud users, a cloud auditor as a third-party professional
organization may be a satisfactory trust root. However,
to some others, the trustworthiness of a cloud auditor
also needs to be evaluated by looking into the auditor’s
attributes and/or policies. Since cloud audit is an impor-
tant mechanism to ensure trustworthiness of clouds,
each cloud auditor should be periodically audited and/or
accredited by a professional association such as Auditing
Standards Board of AICPA.
In formal accreditation, an entity who provides a pro-
fessional service is assessed against official standards, and
is issued with certification of its competency, author-
ity, or credibility. The certification is provided by an
accreditor, who is a third party independent authorized
accreditation organization, and who is also accredited by a
national standard body or professional association. If for-
mal accreditation is applied to clouds, the cloud attribute
assessment from a formal accreditation will be another
important information source for cloud trust judgment.
Accreditation is somewhat similar to audit. In both
cases an entity is assessed by an independent third party;
however, there are subtle differences. First, they may have
different focusing aspects of assessment. Accreditation
focuses on the qualification of the accredited entity with
respect to conducting a specific type of professional ser-
vices; audit focuses on assessing the performance of the
audited entity with respect to the common requirements
of a society and/or the professional standards of a pro-
fessional community. Secondly, audit typically takes place
annually or once per half year; accreditation takes place in
a longer period (e.g. every 5 years).
In summary, in context of cloud computing, the assess-
ments by audit and accreditation are objective and “for-
mal”, but they are not real-time information as from
real-time monitoring.
Observation of cloud brokers
Cloud brokers play an important role. By the NIST defini-
tion [14], a cloud broker is “an entity that manages the use,
performance, and delivery of cloud services, and nego-
tiates relationships between Cloud Providers and Cloud
Consumers.” A cloud broker may provide services in three
categories [14]: (1) service intermediation: for a given
cloud service, to provide value-added additional services
such as performance monitoring and security manage-
ment; (2) service aggregation: to provide an integrated
service by aggregating several cloud services from differ-
ent providers; (3) service arbitrage: to select proper cloud
services in an integrated service, based on the quantified
evaluation of the alternative cloud services. The observa-
tion of a cloud broker can be an important source of cloud
attribute assessment.
The advantages of broker observation include: real-time
cloud service performance monitoring; feedback from
many peer users; an ability to monitor and evaluate a
collection of the same category of cloud services from dif-
ferent providers. A cloud broker potentially has a relatively
complete picture of a cloud service.
However, again the question arises whether a cloud
broker can be trusted with respect to assessing cloud
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attributes. This depends on the relationship between bro-
ker and providers, and between broker and users. A tight
business relation with some cloud providers maymake the
brokers’ opinion be not as objective as the one made in
formal audit or accreditation.
From the perspective of cloud market mechanism we
imagine that if a cloud broker represents a cloud provider,
then the cloud broker may provide information which
favors that cloud provider; however, if a broker is inde-
pendent, and its business depends on the trust relations
with users, the broker is more motivated to find and pro-
vide information being truly helpful for cloud users. This
situation may occur when a cloud broker serves as a gate-
way for a large number of cloud users in the cloud market.
Consistent with the above view, we further imagine that
if a cloud broker is highly trusted by some cloud users
(especially, end cloud users), the brokermay become those
cloud users’ trust anchor, taking care of trust management
for those cloud users.
In order to ensure that a cloud broker behaves as a trust-
worthy cloud entity, cloud users will expect to learn how
a cloud broker works, whether the broker is neutral, what
policies the broker follows, and whether the broker has
certain attributes that can be used as evidence to judge
its trustworthiness. Therefore, essentially a cloud broker
is also expected to be formally audited and/or accredited
either.
Attribute certification
In addition to X.509 identity (public key) certification,
there also exists X.509 attribute certification [37]. Public
key certification is used in authentication; attribute cer-
tification is used for both authentication and authoriza-
tion. An attribute certificate (AC) is a statement digitally
signed by the AC issuer to certify that the AC holder
has a set of specified attributes. The certified attributes
can be access identity, authentication information (e.g.
username/password pairs), group membership, role, and
security clearance [37]. An AC mainly contains the fol-
lowing fields: unique AC identifier, AC holder, AC issuer,
attribute-value pairs, valid period, the Id of the algorithm
used to verify the signature of the AC, and extensions,
which mainly include AC targeting – a list of specified
servers or services where the AC can be used, and CRL
(Certificate Revocation List) distribution points.
The current IETF X.509 AC standard [37] might be con-
sidered for use in cloud attribute certification, but it has
several limitations.
First, the standard does not include important attributes
needed in the cloud context. Extensions are possible to
deal with this, but still no standards regarding service per-
formance, security, and privacy. Second, with respect to
attribute certification, the real authority behind attribute
assertion is the entity who really knows the certified
entity. For example, with respect to the role or member-
ship of an entity in a specific organization, that organi-
zation is naturally the authority to state that attribute.
From this point of view, we should discern the differ-
ence between “attribute assertion authority” (AAA) and
attribute certification authority (ACA, i.e. AC issuer). We
use AA (Attribute Authority) to refer to an entity who
is both AAA and ACA. In the context of clouds, who
plays the role of AA? From our earlier discussion, it is
obvious that the most reliable sources for attribute asser-
tion/assessment are independent third-party professional
organizations such as cloud auditors and accreditors, and
even cloud brokers.
Finally, current IETF X.509 AC standard [37] adopts a
simple trust structure where “one authority issues all of
the ACs for a particular set of attributes”. In cloud applica-
tions (except for small scale private clouds) an AC issuer
may be frequently outside the trust boundary of an AC
user. Therefore, mechanisms for cross-domain attribute
certification and validation are necessary for both hybrid
cloud and public cloud.
An integrated view
Earlier, we envisioned that the attributes of a cloud ser-
vice (or cloud entity) can be used as evidence for a cloud
user to make trust judgment on the service (or entity);
we discussed the sources of cloud attribute assessment
and attribute certification; we also revealed that PKI in
practice uses policy-based trust mechanism, which might
be used in cloud computing either. In this section, we
put together all those mechanisms, including: reputa-
tion based, SLA verification based, transparency based,
formal accreditation and audit, as well as the suggested
policy-based, evidence-based, and cloud attribute certifi-
cation, to construct an overall framework for analyzing
and modeling trust chains among cloud entities.
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the dependence between
the trust placed in various cloud entities and the sources
of evidence for trust judgment. In these figures, the left
part illustrates trust placed on different types of cloud
entities; the right part illustrates trust mechanisms to be
used, which are also the sources of evidence to support
trust judgment; the arrows represent dependence rela-
tions between them; the dependence relations together
form the chains of trust in the cloud. The six mecha-
nisms shown in those pictures are an abstraction of typical
mechanisms; a real system support trust judgment in
practice may involve several mechanisms. For example, a
cloud reputation system may calculate reputation scores,
and also provide assessed attributes from brokers and
users’ reviews. The three mechanisms in the lower-right
part with dotted border-lines are suggested ones and do
not exist yet. Most mechanisms may support trust judg-
ment on different types of cloud entities, but note that for
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Figure 3 Evidence and chains for trust judgment on a cloud
auditor. Trust placed in a cloud auditor is based on one or more of:
(1) accreditation, which is further based on the trust placed on
professionalorganizationsmakingstandardsandaudit/accreditation, –
a part of societal trust; (2) policy compliance, which is audited by
another trusted auditor; (3) attributes, certified by another trusted
auditor.
a samemechanism, the contents to be examined for a spe-
cific type of cloud entity could be different from the ones
for another types of entities. For example, when applied to
a cloud service provider, “policy compliance audit”, refers
to evaluation of a cloud service provider’s conformance
to its cloud service policy; however, when applied to a
cloud auditor, it refers to the evaluation of a cloud auditor
conformance to a cloud audit policy.
Now we discuss each trust judgment task in turn.
Societal trust
Societal trust is foundational in all trust models that
include individuals and organizations; cloud computing
is no exception. Each individual in a society has to place
Figure 4 Evidence and chains for trust judgment on a cloud
broker. Trust placed in a cloud broker is based on one or more of: (1)
accreditation; (2) policy compliance; (3) certified attributes; (4)
self-assessment and information revealing, which is based on the
trust placed in this broker with respect to telling truth; (5) reputation
calculated or recommendation made by another trusted broker.
Trust in cloud service










(CAIQ, CCM, CTP, CA)
Trust in cloud brokers
Trust in cloud auditors
Societal trust
Trust in the law system
Trust in professional orgs
(standards,audit)
Figure 5 Evidence and chains for trust judgment on a cloud
service provider. Similar to the structure of trust judgment on cloud
broker showed in Figure 4.
trust in some basic parts of the society. Examples include:
trust in the law system and government to maintain
social order; trust in some professional services; trust
in professional organizations with respect to creating
and maintaining specific professional services standards.
In the cloud context, examples of professional organi-
zations might include AICPA, NIST (National Institute
of Standards and Technology), IGTF (International Grid
Trust in cloud service










(CAIQ, CCM, CTP, CA)
Trust in cloud brokers
Trust in cloud auditors
Societal trust
Trust in the law system
...
Trust in professional orgs
(standards, audit)
...
Figure 6 Evidence and chains for trust judgment on a cloud
service. Trust placed in a cloud service is based on one or more of: (1)
cloud service provider, whom is trusted; (2) policy compliance; (3)
certified attributes; (4) QoS monitoring and SLA verification, which are
conducted by a trusted party such as a trusted broker; (5) reputation
calculated or recommendation made by a trusted broker.
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Trust Federation), and CSA (Cloud Security Alliance). We
specifically assume that societal trust leads cloud users to
put their trust in the accreditation of cloud entities includ-
ing auditors, brokers, and service providers, with respect
to the qualification of a cloud entity on corresponding
professional services.
While we recognize societal trust as a root of cloud
trust, a deeper treatment of societal trust is beyond the
scope of our overview of trust in clouds.
Trust judgment on a cloud auditor
A cloud auditor is a professional independent assessor of
cloud entities. An auditor conforms to professional poli-
cies and/or standards in his operations. Cloud auditors
should be also externally audited periodically by audit
professional organizations, to ensure they comply with
established policies and standards.
One cloud user might place a cloud auditor in his
trusted societal root, i.e., simply assume the auditor is
trustworthy; another user may choose instead to make a
trust judgment on a cloud auditor as they do on other
cloud entities. By the semantics of trust given in § ‘Seman-
tics of Trust’, for “trust in a cloud auditor”, the expectancy
of a cloud user on a cloud auditor is the objective and pro-
fessional assessment on a cloud entity with respect to its
cloud services against a specific set of standards; the belief
in that expectancy is based on some evidencewith respect
to the auditor’s competency, goodwill, and integrity. For
this judgment, there may be several sources of informa-
tion as shown in Figure 3, and they are discussed as
follows:
• Accreditation: A cloud user may check whether a
specific cloud auditor is formally accredited by an
professional audit organization and/or a cloud
computing professional organization. Belief in
accreditation is further dependent on whether the
cloud user trusts the formal accreditor – an audit
professional organization such as ASB of AICPA.
• Policy compliance audit: A cloud auditor should
conform to professional policies and/or standards in
its audit operations, such as SAS 70, SSAE 16, and
ISAE 3402; the auditor should assess a cloud entity
against widely accepted policies; the quality of the
audit operations of an auditor is also assessed
through audit, conducted by a different auditor
appointed by an professional audit organization. A
cloud user may use the audit results as evidence for
trust judgment. The cloud user’s belief in the audit
result is further dependent on the user’s trust in the
auditor conducting the audit.
• Certified attributes: In addition to accreditation
and policy compliance, a cloud user may want to
check the auditor’s other attributes, such as the
history of the auditor, experiences of those previously
audited by that auditor, the history of the audit
applied to the auditor. Some attributes may be
contained in audit documents; some others may be
certified (or assessed, verified, and digitally signed) by
a peer auditor. The cloud user’s belief in the certified
attributes is dependent on the user’s trust in the
issuer of the certified attributes.
Trust judgment on a cloud broker
As discussed in § ‘Observation of cloud broker’, a cloud
broker provides various intermediate services. Any cloud
entity offering intermediated services may be regarded as
a broker. Examples may include: “market” for cloud ser-
vices such as SpotCloud [38], and TaaS such as CTA [27].
Note that an online reputation and ranking system for
cloud services can also be regarded as a cloud broking
service.
For the concept of “trust in a cloud broker”, the
expectancy of a cloud user on a cloud broker includes
trustworthy value-added services such as bridging and
aggregating services, security and identity management
services, objective and precise evaluation of cloud ser-
vices and their providers. To make evidence-based trust
judgments, as illustrated by Figure 4, the evidence may
include:
• Accreditation: Similar to cloud auditors, a cloud
broker should be qualified for providing cloud
broking services, through formally accreditation by a
cloud computing professional organization.
• Policy compliance audit: A cloud broker should
conform to certain policies and/or standards widely
adopted or accepted by the cloud in the broker’s
operations; the quality of its operations should be
audited by a cloud auditor. A cloud user may use the
audit result as evidence for trust judgment. The cloud
user’s belief in the audit result is further dependent on
the user’s trust in the auditor conducting the audit.
• Attributes (assessed or certified): The attributes of
a cloud broker on competency, goodwill, and
integrity are important evidence for cloud users’ trust
judgment. In addition to the attributes assessed with
respect to policy compliance, other attributes
regarding performance, security, and privacy as
discussed in § ‘Evidence-based trust’ may be also
audited by a cloud auditor, or assessed and digitally
signed by other cloud brokers, or reviewed and
digitally signed by some cloud users. The cloud user’s
belief in the certified/assessed attributes is dependent
on the user’s trust in the issuer of the
certified/assessed attributes.
• Self-assessment and information revealing: Cloud
brokers as a special type of intermediated cloud
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service providers should also adopt the CSA cloud
transparency mechanisms to exercise
self-assessment such as CAIQ and CCM, and
information revealing as does in CTP (discussed in
§ ‘Cloud transparency mechanisms’). The cloud
user’s belief in the information revealed by the broker
is dependent on the user’s trust in that broker with
respect to telling the truth, which may be verified in a
formal audit.
• Reputation/recommendation: Reputation and
recommendation can be very helpful to new cloud
users and/or the users who are planning to
recompose their cloud services. The cloud user’s
belief in the reputation scores and recommendation
is dependent on the user’s trust in the source of the
information, typically, a cloud broker.
Trust judgment on a cloud service provider
The trust expectancy of a user with respect to a provider
is that the provider offers trustworthy cloud services.
The evidence for trust judgment on a cloud service
provider may include the following sources, as shown in
Figure 5:
• Accreditation
• Policy compliance audit
• Attributes (assessed or certified)
• Self-assessment and information revealing
• Reputation/recommendation
All of the above mechanisms are similar to the ones
applied to cloud brokers, save that the trustee is a cloud
service provider rather than a cloud broker.
Trust judgment on a cloud service
We view a cloud service as an autonomous agent; and that
“a cloud user trusts a cloud service” means that the user
has the expectancy that the cloud service is trustworthy,
which means that the cloud service has a set of attributes
including reliability, availability, confidentiality, integrity,
safety, and privacy; the user believes the expectancy to
be true based on some evidence, from diverse sources,
shown in Figure 6:
• Trust based on the service provider: by trust in
performance, a user trusts a cloud service with
respect to performance, security, and privacy, based
on the identity of the provider. If the user trusts that
the provider gives trustworthy cloud services, then
the cloud service is trusted.
• Policy compliance audit: A cloud user may
examine specific policies and/or standards applied to
the service, and investigate the results of formal
audits of the provider.
• Attributes (assessed or certified): A cloud user
may examine the attributes of a cloud service
regarding performance, security, and privacy, which
may be audited by a cloud auditor, or assessed and
digitally signed by cloud brokers, or reviewed and
digitally signed by some cloud users. The belief in
those attributes is dependent on the trust in the
corresponding attribute assessor.
• Self-assessment and information revealing: A
cloud user may study information about the service
which is revealed by the service provider through
cloud transparency mechanisms. The user’s belief in
the information is dependent on the user’s trust in
the cloud service provider with respect to telling the
truth.
• QoS monitoring and SLA verification: QoS
monitoring and SLA verification (a shorter term
“QoS/SLA monitoring” is used in Figure 6) is an
important source to verify trust and to adjust trust. If
the monitoring is conducted by a cloud broker, then
the belief in the results of monitoring is dependent on
the trust in that broker with respect to objective and
professional monitoring.
• Reputation/recommendation: a cloud user may
trust a cloud service, based on a trusted cloud
broker’s recommendation. Similar to PKI trust,
recommendation may be handled in two ways: one
regards the “recommendation” as the broker’s trust in
that recommended service, and then derives indirect
trust on that service through using trust in belief
relation with the broker; another is (as in PKI
practice) that the broker only certifies that that cloud
service has certain attributes or conforms to certain
policies, and cloud users to make their own decision
whether to trust that service.
Further discussion
As seen above, the trust placed on a cloud entity may be
dependent on several sources of evidence; however, it is
unnecessary to use all of them; a cloud usermay use one or
more sources of evidence for trust judgment, dependent
on the user’s trust policy. For example, to decide whether
to trust a cloud service provider, a cloud user may simply
just check whether the provider passed the formal audit
of a widely accepted cloud service policy, conducted by a
trusted auditor.
In the discussion above, the trust mechanisms of rep-
utation/recommendation, QoS monitoring and SLA ver-
ification, self-assessment and information revealing are
already in development; formal accreditation is in dis-
cussion, but it does not exist yet; trust mechanisms
of attribute assessment/certification, which is used for
evidence-based trust judgment, and policy compliance




























Figure 7 Chains of trust relations in clouds. This figure provides an integrated picture to illustrate the chains of trust relations from a cloud user
to a cloud service and related cloud entities, where accreditation is omitted for simplicity.
audit, which is used for policy-based trust judgment,
are what we suggest, and do not exist in the cloud yet;
however policy-based trust has been successfully (more or
less) used in PKI practice, and the practice is a proof of
feasibility.
The mechanism of using attribute assessment/certi-
fication and evidence-based trust judgment could be com-
plex, due to a possibly large set of attributes to consider
and a possibly long chains of trust relations. Nevertheless,
the policy-based trust judgment can be actually regarded
as a simplified version of the attribute/evidence-based
mechanism, in the sense that a widely accepted policy
captures a set of key attributes.
In the above figures, the trust relations with various
cloud entities, shown in the left part of the figures,
are dependent on various sources of evidence, shown
in the right part of figures; and the derivation of a
source of evidence is dependent on some trust rela-
tions either. All those dependence relations form the
chains of trust. Figure 7 illustrates some chains of trust
focusing on policy-based and attribute/evidence-based
mechanisms.
Summary and further research
Trust is a critical aspect of cloud computing. We exam-
ined and categorized existing research and practice of
trust mechanisms for cloud computing in five categories–
reputation based, SLA verification based, transparency
mechanisms (self-assessment and information revealing),
trust as a service, and formal accreditation, audit, and
standards. Most current work on trust in the cloud focus
narrowly on certain aspects of trust; our thesis is that this
is insufficient. Trust is a complex social phenomenon, and
a systemic view of trust mechanism analysis is necessary.
In this paper we take a broad view of trust mechanism
analysis in cloud computing and develop a somewhat
informal and abstract framework as a route map for ana-
lyzing trust in the clouds. In particular, we suggest: (1)
a policy-based approach of trust judgment, by which the
trust placed on a cloud service or a cloud entity is derived
from a “formal” audit proving that the cloud entity con-
forms to some trusted policies; (2) a “formal” attribute-
based approach of trust judgment, by which particular
attributes of a cloud service or attributes of a service
provider are used as evidence for trust judgment, and
the belief in those attributes is based on formal certifi-
cation and chains of trust for validation. To support this
mechanism, we propose a general structure of evidence-
based trust judgment, which provides a basis to infer the
trust in a cloud entity from the belief in the attributes
that entity has, and in which, based on the semantics
of trust, we define the attributes to be examined are
in a space of two-dimensions – domain of expectancy
and source of trust including competency, integrity, and
goodwill.
Future research will focus on mathematically formal
frameworks for reasoning about trust, including model-
ing, languages, and algorithms for computing trust.
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